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THE POTENTIAL OF
NEUROECONOMICS
COLIN F. CAMERER
California Institute of Technology
The goal of neuroeconomics is a mathematical theory of how the brain
implements decisions, that is tied to behaviour. This theory is likely
to show some decisions for which rational-choice theory is a good
approximation (particularly for evolutionarily sculpted or highly learned
choices), to provide a deeper level of distinction among competing
behavioural alternatives, and to provide empirical inspiration for economics
to incorporate more nuanced ideas about endogeneity of preferences,
individual difference, emotions, endogeneous regulation of states, and so
forth. I also address some concerns about rhetoric and practical epistemology.
Neuroscience articles are necessarily speculative and the science has
proceeded rapidly because of that rhetorical convention. Single-study papers
are encouraged and are necessarily limited in what can be inferred, so
the sturdiest cumulation of results, and the best guide forward, comes in
review journals which compile results and suggest themes. The potential
of neuroeconomics is in combining the clearest experimental paradigms
and statistical methods in economics, with the unprecedented capacity
to measure a range of neural and cognitive activity that economists like
Edgeworth, Fisher and Ramsey daydreamed about but did not have.
Debating the potential of neuroeconomics is much less interesting than
debating the results and interpretations of particular studies. Furthermore,
there is actually little disagreement that there is potential in understanding
how the brain makes economic choices.
My comments will simply reiterate some of the ideas about what
neuroeconomics is trying to do, mention some possible results, and then
directly address some specific assertions which are misguided.
The goal of neuroeconomics is to build up a mechanistic,
behavioural and mathematical theory of choice and exchange. To clarify,
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“behavioural” means observed choices. “Mechanistic” means at some
level of neural circuitry, which includes psychophysiological measurement
(skin conductance, heart rate, facial muscle movement, startle eyeblink
responses, etc.), tracking of eye movements, and any other biological
measure. Response times are surely useful too, and the easiest to measure
though they are actually a choice of time rather than a choice; I am certainly
glad that Rubinstein (2008, this issue) is one of the many people gathering
these data and putting them to work.
Note that economics (in the form of revealed preferences and the
myriad axiomatic foundations of decision) already has a mathematical and
behavioural theory, but the theory is usually interpreted as agnostic about
the mechanistic details.1 Conversely, many neuroscience investigations
compare behaviour and speculate about mechanism but do not use the
language of computation or mathematics to link the two.
For most economists, the ideal contribution of neuroeconomics would
go further than showing a mechanistic basis for behaviour expressed in
mathematical form. The biggest challenge is to show a neural basis for
some kinds of choices or judgments, which predicts how an observable
variable would influence choices in a reduced-form model in a surprising
new way.
For example, suppose one found that activity in a brain region R
was correlated with how quickly information is reflected in prices in an
experimental market. (Ideally, one would establish even more by showing
that markets with subjects who are patients with damage to R have
slower information aggregation, or that TMS disruption of region R slows
information aggregation, or that adding a distractor task which activates
R changes the rate of information aggregation.) Using what is known
about the types of tasks or stimuli that activate R (that’s one of the hard
parts), one can then hypothesize that an observable event or condition in
the world would activate R (that’s the other hard part) and would slow
down information aggregation in actual markets. Some neuroeconomists
are thinking about this but have not produced a knockout example
yet.
1 It is useful to point out, by the way, that the foundation of choice was not always considered
only a matter of linking unobserved constructs to observed choice and ignoring mechanism.
Ramsey, Fisher and Edgeworth were among the classical economists who fantasized about
measuring hedonic bases of utility directly (Ramsey spoke of a “psychogalvanometer”
and Edgeworth of a “hedonimeter”; see Colander, 2008). Admittedly, they were mostly
interested in being able to establish a cardinal measure of utility, which is far from the focus
of modern neuroeconomics. Given how interested these early economists were in direct
measurement – when they could not readily do so – one might think that their intellectual
descendants would be at least as interested when tools like those they fantasized about are
actually available.
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What could neural mechanisms of measurement tell us about a good
mathematical foundation of observed behaviour?
I see three possibilities: The mechanisms could appear to implement
rational-choice theories (perhaps for some types of decisions or for
some people, such as experts); the mechanisms could appear to favour
some kinds of behavioural economics alternatives over others; or the
mechanisms could inspire us to think about variables that are likely to be
important but do not currently have a central place in standard economic
theory. These hidden variables might include willpower, attention,
emotion, indecision, effects of advertising, etc., as in Spiegler’s thoughtful
comment (2008, this issue) and Harrison’s interesting section 4 (2008, this
issue).
Mechanisms of rational choice: One possibility is that some kinds of
choices will turn out to be mechanistically implemented in ways that match
familiar math and observed behaviour (e.g. Bayesian models of integration
of sensory and motor activity are popular now among neuroscientists).
Mechanisms of behavioural alternatives: Another possibility is that
understanding the mechanistic details might help inform debate about
which mathematical models of behaviour are correct. As many readers
will know, there is a lively debate within the economics profession about
which mathematical models of which observed behaviour are on the right
track, in the form of “behavioural economics” alternatives to normative
rational-choice principles.
For example, expected utility theory is one mathematical form of
combining risks and outcomes; much of its empirical appeal comes from
the normative appeal of the independence axiom. Another is prospect
theory, which takes its shape from psychophysical principles (sensitivity
to a point of reference, and diminishing marginal sensitivity of value and
probability weight when moving away from local reference points). There
is still a very lively debate about which theory gives the best account of
which types of data. Prospect theory is the most widely cited empirical
article published in economics from 1970–2005 (Kim, Zingales and Morse
2007) but few graduate preliminary exams in decision theory include
questions about its details. The available neural evidence thus far is
supportive of the hypothesis that brain activity responds to framing of
gambles, loss and gain differentials, and nonlinear weighting of probability
(see Fox and Poldrack in press).
Another example is the study of ambiguity-aversion – the reluctance
to act in the face of missing information or uncertainty about probability.
This has been modelled in many, many different ways, including multiple
priors, set-valued priors, hierarchies of second-order belief, and mean-
dispersion preferences (e.g. Grant and Polak 2007). I believe it is safe to say
that empirically separating these theories with naturally occurring data
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would be very difficult, although trying to do it is an excellent research
topic.2
However, if the theories were described not only in terms of their
axioms and the functional representations of choice implied by those
axioms (the math, and the behaviour), but also in terms of their brain
implementation, then one could test among the theories using brain data.
Note that the point of such tests is not to establish the neuroscience of
ambiguity-aversion per se (although that may interest neuroscientists).
The point is to use brain evidence to adjudicate empirically among theories
which are particularly difficult to distinguish using the market-prediction
test (for ordinary types of data). The brain data is a way to keep pace with
the remarkable ability of economic theorists to invent new mathematical
foundations for a small set of observed phenomena.
My paper with Hsu et al. (2005) had this intent. In ambiguity and risk
choices, we find some evidence for activity in response to “mean” expected
utility in the striatum, and a strong response to ambiguity (compared to
risk) in lateral OFC, dorsolateral PFC, and the amygdala. The fact that
different regions are activated differently by the mean and by the degree of
ambiguity suggests that a model in which these two elements are evaluated
separately is on the right track.
However, this interpretation does not get far unless we have some idea
from dozens of other studies – or in some areas of neuroscience, hundreds –
about what general functions these areas seem to perform.
The striatum is reliably activated by many types of reward (money,
cocaine, attractive pictures, curiosity-provoking trivia questions) so it is
plausible that the striatum would also activate a sense of mean reward (or
more likely, prediction error). The amygdala is thought of as a “vigilance”
area that responds to fear and potential threat (though it is sometimes
activated by positive learning). If you were forced to build a brain that
would implement mean-dispersion preferences, and would like higher
mean but dislike ambiguity (“fear of the economic unknown”), you might
do it by having the striatum and OFC-amygdala activate much as they
actually seem to do.
2 One might wonder why we care about separating theories that have the same observable
implications about field data. The answer is that the theories will often make different
predictions about responses to changes in the economic environment. Recall Friedman and
Savage’s justly celebrated example of the pool players who “act as if” they understand the
laws of physics (probably from learning to play by trial-and-error). Whether they act as if,
or truly understand, physical laws will make a difference when the friction of the surface
is changed or the pool table is warped and uneven. Act-as-ifers will make mistakes in the
new environments but physical-law-knowers won’t. Since economic environments are also
undergoing constant change, the “as if” vs “really do know” distinction is important in
economics too.
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Is this account “too speculative”? It is speculative, but at this point
speculating is all we can do and is necessary to make progress. Speculation
of this sort is simply a process of conjecturing interpretations in a way that
can be tested in more experiments.
Another potential use of neural data is to speed up the process of
resolving fundamental debates. For example, Harrison (2008, this issue)
has suggested that “we have conceptual work to do before we fire up
the scanner”, in the context of the debate about whether ultimatum-game
rejections are due to a taste for reciprocity built into utilities, or reflect
“field-hardened heuristics for playing repeated games”. His view seems
to be that we shouldn’t do any brain scanning until the “conceptual work”
is done.
However, these two interpretations about ultimatum rejections (as well
as other prosocial behaviour like public goods giving) have been around
for decades. There is no resolution in sight. Therefore, it is possible that
the resolution could come much faster if we “fire up the scanner” soon
rather than waiting for the conceptual work project to be finished. For
example, if there was some agreement on what brain activity would result
when a person who has developed “field-hardened heuristics” adapted to
one environment is placed in an environment where those are no longer
adaptive, or what it would mean neurally to have a utility for reciprocity
in one-shot games, we could do the experiments and see what happens.
Mechanisms suggesting “new” variables: The most exciting possibility is
that the neural studies will give us an empirically disciplined way to talk
about variables that are thought to be important but which do not fit neatly
into the fruitful preferences-beliefs-constraints structure (as in Spiegler’s
(2008, this issue) example of indecision).
For example, Rubinstein writes that “once we have enriched models of
bounded rationality, it would make sense not to simply invent procedures
from off the top of our heads but to use models based on our understanding
of the mind”.
There are many other potential examples: The nature of brain plasticity
and human capital formation; the role of emotions and direct social
interaction in service businesses; implicit and explicit discrimination
in labour markets; motivations of workers and how business practices
harness those motivations; genetic and intergenerational transmission of
preferences and beliefs in families (with implications for demographic
structure, and management of family firms); changes in neural activity
across the life-cycle; behavioural genetics as a basis for understanding
individual differences; emotional self-regulation in decision making; the
nature of social interaction and emotion in service purchases in different
media; the neural basis of contagion and panics in macroeconomic crises,
and so on.
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EPISTEMOLOGY AND EMPIRICAL PRACTICE
Harrison rightly points attention to the epistemology of neuroeco-
nomics – the basis for knowledge claims.
The standard attacks on the quality of the data produced are surprising
and a little exasperating for at least three reasons:
(a) Neuroscientists worry about methods and data quality frequently
and are constantly making improvements (and neuroeconomists
even more so). Journals are filled with methodology articles and
neuroscientists are constantly innovating in how different tools are
combined, improving experimental designs and statistical efficiency.
(b) Some people who do not know the methods work in detail are
automatically suspicious. For example, Rubinstein (208, this issue)
writes with typical candor that “colorful diagrams, which mean
nothing to economists, are presented as clear evidence. To me, they
look like a marketing gimmick . . . I almost always have the feeling of
being (unintentionally) manipulated”.
The fact that economists don’t know how to interpret these diagrams
is a statement about what economists don’t know, not a statement about
what neuroscientists do know. Fortunately, the knowledge gap will be
narrowed as efforts are undertaken to communicate more across scientific
language barriers (e.g. Glimcher et al., 2008).
With that said, it is true that a large degree of interpretive speculation
is allowed in the field. Neuroscientists are expected and encouraged to
speculate. Speculation is allowed because interesting results are quickly
noticed and challenged by those who disagree with the speculation. This
dialectic often results in clear conclusions rapidly (much more rapidly than
in economics, which is almost glacial in comparison). Furthermore, the best
diagrams usually offer clear evidence because results of many different
studies are shown to activate common regions (in review journals like
Trends in Cognitive Science and Nature Reviews Neuroscience). Economists
should appreciate, therefore, that knowledge is reported and cumulated
in two different ways – in “small” studies (typically with only one
experiment) and in review articles that summarize dozens of those single-
experiment studies, search for coherent themes, and sharply articulate
open questions.
(c) Most dismissive criticisms ignore the fact that knowledge is produced
by a series of studies with different tools.
For judging epistemology, the multiplicity of methods and cumulation
across studies is absolutely a key point. Each method has limits, but limits
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are ideally compensated for by advantages of other methods. Furthermore,
results of studies that are unclear are usually clarified by later studies.
fMRI is the most natural target for criticism because there is indeed
something fascinating about seeing images of the brain. Harrison (2008,
section 2.A) notes the many steps of “preprocessing” involved in matching
up structural images (which have the best resolution of brain anatomy) to
functional ones, correcting for errors resulting from head motion, and
normalizing brains onto a common template. These steps are absolutely
necessary if the goal is to gain power from across-subjects random-effects
analysis.
Neuroscience has a good check on surprising results – rapid
replication, and the requirement that hypotheses suggested by one method
be corroborated by another method which has some advantages over the
first one. Poldrack and Wagner (2004) suggest that “reverse inference” –
the common practice of seeing that area A is activated differently in tasks
T1 and T2 and then inferring something about activity in the tasks – should
be considered simply a way to derive hypotheses which are tested in other
experiments or with other methods. For example, the best studies find
activity in interpretable regions and also see differences in activity in those
regions which are correlated with behaviourally derived parameters across
subjects.
In the Hsu et al. (2005) study, we used the fact that lateral OFC was
more strongly activated in ambiguity tasks than in risk tasks to guess that
patients with lesions to this region would be ambiguity-neutral. A separate
study found that they were. Note that one can criticize the lesion study for
its small sample (N = 5 lesion patients) and can criticize the fMRI study
for its reverse inference speculation about the role of the OFC. However,
one must criticize the general conclusion from the conjunction of the two
studies since it is precisely their complementarity that matters.
Indeed, a great strength of neuroscience is that data come from
many different methods – response times, psychophysiology (skin
conductance, facial muscle recording), “single-unit” recording of neural
firing rates, animal behavioural studies, genetic engineering, eyetracking,
EEG, PET, fMRI, lesion studies, genetics, pharmacological manipulation,
measurement of concentration of neurotransmitters, and TMS.3 Each of
these to some extent compensates for weakness of the others. For example,
it is often difficult to know from an fMRI study whether a region has
3 EEG is electroencephalography (recording from scalp electrodes, which is very fast and
potentially portable), PET is positron emission tomography, and TMS is “transcranial
magnetic stimulation”, the use of a magnetic coil to disrupt activity in a brain area
(sometimes called “temporary lesions”). Despite the ethical objections to TMS mentioned
by Harrison, it is widely used and approved routinely by IRB boards that are charged
specifically with making institution-level judgments about what is ethical and what is not.
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been located that is causally involved in behaviour. But if that region
is temporarily disrupted by TMS or permanently damaged by a lesion,
and behaviour changes, then the two studies together (fMRI plus TMS or
lesions plus TMS) have shown something more solid.
“STRAW MEN”
Harrison says that neuroeconomists “repeatedly set up straw men to knock
down”. I do not believe this is common at all.
A typical dictionary definition of a “straw man” is this: “To argue
against a straw man is to interpret someone’s position in an unfairly weak
way, and so argue against a position that nobody holds, or is likely to
hold.”
For example, Harrison notes a passage in my 2004 paper about “state-
contingent preferences” and says “Of course, economists have known this
for decades”. Then continuing, “Whether or not we use a state-dependent
approach in analysis is a separate matter. The extreme alternative, and
no straw man, is presented by Stigler and Becker (1977). They are clearly
proposing the view that assuming that preferences are stable, and common
across individuals, is simply a more useful approach [than state-dependent
preferences]” (italics added).
So first we are criticized for endorsing state-contingent preference
(as if the noncontingent approach is a straw man), then are told that the
Stigler–Becker noncontingent approach is “no straw man”. Which is it?
Economics is in the unusual position of having very simple
specifications that are routinely used in analysis but which are widely
known to be approximations that are easy to refute (e.g. expected value
maximization). I do not regard these simplifications as straw men because
they are not “positions that nobody holds” invented by a neuroeconomist;
they are deliberate oversimplifications often used by economists as
benchmarks. Furthermore, it is very useful to describe data in terms of
deviations from these simplifications, as a way of learning which extended
specifications are better.
A good example is self-interested preferences. This preference
specification is clearly not a straw man because that simple form of
preference is actually used in many types of analysis (e.g. in standard agency
theory and empirical tests, in political science, and so forth).
Furthermore, belief in self-interest is not a position nobody holds
because it is often clearly espoused. Stigler (1981: 176) wrote that when
“self-interest and ethical values with wide verbal allegiance are in conflict,
much of the time, most of the time in fact, self-interest theory . . . will win”.
List (2006) calls this statement “conventional wisdom among economists”.
Even if economists don’t believe it, self-interest is the routine
assumption used in almost all most analyses (with important exceptions
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like the studies of bequests, intra-household behaviour, and charitable
giving, where narrow self-interest is obviously violated). Using self-
interest as a benchmark assumption is simply a way to learn which of
these types of preferences exist and studying their nature.
FINALLY, LANGUAGE
Glenn Harrison is one of those people who is known for his remarkable
skill in choosing language to infuriate even people who largely agree
with him. (This is not an ad hominem attack; it is an empirical fact.) In
his paper he refers to aspects of neuroeconomics as “academic marketing
hype”, “fluff”, (and in another paper “jingoism”!?). I don’t understand
what these dismissive terms mean or how they apply.
For example, in one of my papers we describe the problem of how to
model “choosing” to fall asleep at the wheel while driving. We jokingly say
that one could think of such an action as revealing a stronger preference
for sleep than for life. Glenn complains that “this is lousy, sucker-punch
economics” and “can be waved away by any student of economics”. Our
satirical “explanation” is indeed “lousy economics” – that is exactly the
point.
But what is the correct unlousy economic analysis of the sleepy
driver’s choice? Our point is simple (and we thought, obvious): You could
conceivably describe this choice in the language of preferences, beliefs
or constraints but it would be silly to do so, and it would tell you very
little about designing cars or which public policies might work (such as
offering free coffee on holiday weekends to tired drivers). For example, in
his rejoinder Harrison says “any graduate student” would say that “the
answer is that the driver chose a lottery when he got in the car tired, and
his subjective probabilities of the various outcomes might have differed
from the actuarial probabilities”. But as the sleepy driver gets sleepier, the
gap between subjective and actuarial probability widens. Moments before
actually falling asleep the driver thinks there is no chance of an accident
and the actual chance is quite high. Why does the gap widen? One can
describe the mechanism in terms of subjective and objective (actuarial)
beliefs but the entire point of the example is the dynamics over time.
What is wrong with inferring that the level of fatigue should be
considered a state variable which is partly exogenous and partly under
conscious control, and the fatigue level itself affects some kinds of motor
control and judgment which affects “choice”. That is, fatigue both creates
a gap between perceived and actual risks, and influences the ability of
the perceptual system to close the gap. This can certainly be described
in the language of economics but it requires an admission that a visceral
state both influences belief and influences processing of information in
updating belief. A similar Chicago-esque view is that there is scarce
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“capital” in the form of attention or cognitive control, which is needed
to make optimal decisions while driving, and fatigue temporarily lessens
that capital. Fatigue is only one such visceral variable – others which might
be important in economic and political decision making include lust (ask
Elliot Spitzer and Bill Clinton), inebriation, pain, anger, hunger, fear and so
forth. Neuroscience tools will help us understand how all these processes
and emotions work in the brain (as will evolutionary psychology and
many other fields).
Harrison’s paper also includes some vaguer broad claims. Note that
neuroscientists and neuroeconomists have many points of view and ways
of doing and reporting their research. Simply because one paper may lack
technical detail (from Glenn’s perspective) should not indict an entire field.
The fact that Marxist economists can join the AEA and come to its annual
meetings does not mean that the economics profession should be criticized
for “its” Marxism.
For a blog or casual conversation it is okay to use language as he does,
but in a scholarly journal these claims require citation. Some of them are
serious accusations. I challenge him to cite specific examples.
“In many cases it is impossible to figure out, without an extraordinary
amount of careful reading, exactly what was done in the economics part
of the experiment and statistical analysis.” How many cases is “many”?
Name several. [In his rejoinder, Harrison names four articles; I regard
them as clear enough but readers can judge for themselves. He also does
not answer the question of how many is “many”.]
“One wonders how incestuous and unquestioning the refereeing
process has become in certain journals”. Name the “certain journals”.
What evidence or inference makes you think the process is “incestuous
and unquestioning”? [In his rejoinder, Harrison names Nature and Science,
but does not give any evidence or describe his inference except to assert
that they have “low standards for science”.]
“. . . some of the debates on discounting behaviour, risk aversion
‘calibration’, and the existence of loss aversion, have taken on a resolutely
thuggish tone that discourages useful discussion.” Give an example of
a “thuggish tone”. Explain why it discourages useful discussion. [In his
rejoinder Harrison does not answer these questions.]
“From the perspective of economists, the neuroeconomics literature
seems to have used a production function with a sub-optimal mix of human
capital and physical capital”. What is the right mix? Which authors are not
supplying enough human capital? Whose human capital should be used?
[In his rejoinder, Harrison says “too little of the former [human capital]”
but does not say which authors are supplying too little or whose human
capital should be used.]
“As the behavioural economics literature demonstrated, however, we
already knew how to do poor economics (and get it published)”. Give
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an example. If the papers you name are so “poor” how did they get
published? [In his rejoinder, Harrison does not give an example from
behavioural economics. His answer to “how did they get published?” is
“poor refereeing, or low standards for science”.]
“Since economists have important and serious questions to get on
with, the opportunity cost of these diversions [academic marketing claims]
has just become too great to ignore.” What are the important and serious
questions? How do these “diversions” incur an opportunity cost? Why is
the opportunity cost “too great to ignore”? [In his rejoinder, Harrison does
not answer these questions.]
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